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1. Plaintiff/Appellant: Judy Price 
2. Defendant/Appellee: Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. 
3. Pyggy, Inc. dba Market Source West is not a party to this appeal. The other 
two parties to this appeal stipulated to dismiss Plaintiffs claims against 
Pyggy, Inc. dba Market Source West reserving the right to list Pyggy, Inc. 
dba Market Source West on the special verdict. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Appellee was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law because there was no evidence of how long the 
temporary hazard was in existence prior to Appellant's incident and therefore Appellant 
was unable to show that Appellee had constructive notice of the temporary hazard. 
B. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Appellee was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law because there was no evidence that Appellee 
delegated its duty to use reasonable care to maintain its store in a reasonable safe 
condition to Market Source demonstrator Stephen Tyler. 
C. Whether the trial court correctly applied its discretion and avoided manifest 
error in granting summary judgment to Appellee. 
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II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a Motion for Summary Judgment, an appellate court accords no 
deference to a trial court's legal conclusions but examines them for correctness. 
Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992); Schurtz v. BMW of North Am., Inc., 814 
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 is attached hereto in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
NATURE OF TFIE CASE 
This case arose from an injury allegedly sustained as the result of a slip and fall of 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Judy Price ("Price"), in a grocery store operated by Defendant 
and Appellee, Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. ("Smith's") on April 2, 2005, in Utah 
County. (Amended Complaint, U 9, R. 100.) 
II. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
On or about May 15,2006, Price filed her Complaint in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Civil No. 060401509 PI (Complaint, R. 5.) On or about August 3,2006, Smith's 
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filed its Answer to Price's Complaint. (Answer, R. 36.) On or about May 14. 2008, Price 
filed her Amended Complaint. (Amended Complaint, R. 101.) On or about May 30, 
2008, Smith's filed its Answer to Price's Amended Complaint. (Answer to Amended 
Complaint, R. 153.) On or about November 4, 2008, Smith's filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 170; Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 251.) On or about November 26, 2008, 
Price filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and on or about December 9, 2008, Smith's filed its Reply Memorandum. 
(Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 
305; Defendant's Reply Memorandum, R. 370.) Oral arguments were held on March 2, 
2009. The trial court issued its decision granting Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on April 13, 2009. (Decision, R. 538.) The trial court signed the Order granting Smith's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on June 3, 2009. (Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Order of Final Judgment, R. 606.) 
On or about May 4, 2009, Price filed her Notice of Appeal from the Trial Court's 
Order. (Notice of Appeal, R. 584.) The Utah Supreme Court issued an Order on or about 
May 14, 2009, transferring Price's summary judgment appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. (Order, R. 594.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case arose out of an incident on April 2, 2005, in which Price slipped 
and fell on water on the floor of a Smith's grocery store located in American Fork, Utah. 
(Amended Complaint, % 9, R. 100.) 
2. Price's Amended Complaint names Smith's as a defendant and Pyggy, Inc., 
dba Market Source West ("Market Source") as a defendant. (Amended Complaint, f^ [ 2-3, 
R. 101.) 
3. In her Amended Complaint, Price brought four causes of action against 
Smith's: negligence, negligence - vicarious liability, negligence - failure to supervise, and 
res ipsa loquitur. (Amended Complaint, fflj 12-22, R. 98-99.) However, on appeal, Price 
is only asserting two causes of action: negligence and negligence - vicarious liability. 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 3, attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit "B.") 
4. On April 2, 2005, Price and her granddaughter, Judy Chance, went to the 
American Fork Smith's store to purchase strawberries. (Deposition of Judy Price, pp. 18-
19, R. 224-225.) 
5. After picking up the strawberries in the produce section of the store, the two 
began walking toward the check stands. As they traveled in the direction of the check 
stands, Price slipped and fell on a water spill that was outside of the produce section but 
near the bread aisle. {Id. at 22, 26, 29, R. 221-223.) 
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6. Price does not know the time of the accident, though she thinks it could 
have been u5 something, 5:20, 5 something." {Id. at 19, R. 224.) 
7. The Smith's store manager. Chuck Brown, believes that Price fell at 5:00 
p.m. or just minutes thereafter. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 44, R. 427.) 
8. Though Price did not notice the size of the water spill, Mr. Brown estimated 
that the spill was approximately eight inches in diameter. Ms. Chance thought that the 
spill could be as large as two 8-by-l 1-inch pieces of paper. (Deposition of Judy Price, p. 
37, R. 216; Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 47, R. 205; Deposition of Judy Chance, p. 32, 
R. 202.) 
9. Price does not know how the water got on the store floor: 
Q. Do you know how water got on the floor before you 
fell? 
A. I didn't know there was water on the floor, so how 
could I know how it got there? 
Q. Again, you'd just be guessing on what it was and how 
that happened? 
A. That's correct. 
(Deposition of Judy Price, pp. 36, R. 217.) 
10. Price does not know how long the water had been on the floor prior to her 
accident: 
Q. Do you know how long the water had been on the floor 
before you fell? 
A. I have no idea. I didn't see the water. I have no - only 
what people - what he said. I never - 1 never saw the 
water. 
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* # * 
Q. So given that you learned after you felt it was water, do 
you know how long that water had been on the floor 
before you fell on it? 
A. I have no - 1 have no idea, I mean -
Q. That would just be speculation on your part? 
A. Absolutely. 
(Id. at 33-35, R. 218-220.) 
11. Price has no reason to believe that an employee knew of the water spill 
prior to her accident: 
Q. Do you know if any employee of the Smith's knew 
about the water before your slipped on it? 
A. I have no reason to believe they did. I have no idea. 
(Mat 35-36, R. 217-218.) 
12. Price's granddaughter, Ms. Chance, does not know how the water got on 
the store floor. She does not know how long it had been on the floor prior to Price's 
accident. She does not know if any store employee knew of the water spill prior to 
Price's accident. (Deposition of Judy Chance, pp. 33-34, R. 200-201.) 
13. When Mr. Brown initially arrived at the scene of the accident, he saw the 
water spill and could not figure out how the water came to be on the floor. Upon 
reflection, however, Mr. Brown guessed that the water spill came from a demonstrator for 
Market Source, Stephen Tyler, who was demonstrating meats and cheeses from 12:00 
p.m. to 5:00 p.m. at the store. Mr. Brown bases this assumption on his recollection that 
he saw a cup of water on the demonstrator's table at approximately 4:00 p.m., that Price 
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slipped and fell in the area where the demonstrator had been demonstrating before leaving 
at 5:00 p.m., and that there are no other nearby sources of water where Price slipped and 
fell. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, pp. 32, 37, 44-45, R. 207-208, 426-427.) 
14. If the water came from Mr. Tyler as guessed by Mr. Brown in Mr. Brown's 
deposition prior to Mr. Tyler's deposition, the water spill would have been on the store 
floor a very brief time. Mr. Brown guesses that at the longest, the water could have been 
present for 10 minutes. {Id. at 45, R. 426.) 
15. No store employee was aware of the water spill prior to Price's accident. 
{Id. at 46, R. 425.) 
16. In addition to a culture of cleanliness and maintenance, the store has a 
formal policy of inspecting its store floors at least once every hour to make certain that 
the store is free from temporary hazards. {Id. at 16-17, R. 210-211.) 
17. On the day in question, the store inspected the store floors on eight separate 
occasions from 4:24 p.m. to 4:58 p.m., as follows: 
4:24 p.m., 4:26 p.m., 4:29 p.m., 4:33 p.m., 4:34 p.m., 4:43 p.m., 4:50 p m., 
and 4:58 p.m. 
The store inspected the store floors another four times during the five o'clock hour, as 
follows: 
5:12 p.m., 5:38 p.m., 5:55 p.m., 5:57 p.m. 
(Smith's Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures, Floor Inspection Report, R. 187-193.) 
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18. At his deposition, Mr. Tyler testified that he arrived at the Smith's store at 
noon and left at 5:00 p.m. on the day of the incident. (Deposition of Stephen Tyler, p. 14, 
attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit "C") 
19. Mr. Tyler was adamant that he did not have a glass of water at his 
demonstration table and that he did not spill any water on April 2, 2005. (Deposition of 
Stephen Tyler, pp. 21-22, 28, 42, R. 171, 176, 178-179.) 
20. Mr. Tyler stressed that water was not a component to his demonstration of 
deli meats and cheeses and that a cup or bottle of water at the demonstration table would 
pose a food safety risk. (Id. at 21-22, R. 178-179.) 
21. Mr. Tyler testified that while he was demonstrating at Smith's on the day of 
the incident, he never saw anyone spill anything and he never saw any spill of any kind on 
the floors of the Smith's store. (Id. at 28, R. 176.) 
22. Mr. Tyler was not an employee of Smith's but was a demonstrator for 
Market Source. (Id. at 6-7, R. 183-184.) 
23. Mr. Tyler was not compensated by Smith's in any way. Instead, he was 
paid by Market Source. (Id. at 32, R. 175.) 
24. Market Source was a demonstration company that demonstrated product at 
the request of the vendor or manufacturer of the product to be demonstrated. (Deposition 
of Chuck Brown, p. 7, attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit "D.") 
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25. The demonstration company pays Smith's for the product that is 
demonstrated. (Id. at 10, Addendum, Exhibit "D.") 
26. The demonstration company demonstrators do not work for Smith's. (Id. at 
13, Addendum, Exhibit "D/') 
27. Smith's does not pay the demonstration company. Instead, the 
demonstration company is paid by the vendor or manufacturer that hired the 
demonstration company to demonstrate the product. (Id. at 19, Addendum, Exhibit "D.") 
28. As a demonstrator for Market Source, Mr. Tyler wore a Market Source 
uniform consisting of a bow tie and apron and not a Smith's uniform as he demonstrated. 
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 11-12, R. 181-182.) 
29. As a demonstrator for Market Source, Mr. Tyler was not supervised by 
Smith's employees. (Id. at 28, R. 176; Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 10, R. 213.) 
30. As a demonstrator, Mr. Tyler did not receive assistance from Smith's 
employees in setting up or taking down his demonstration within the Smith's store. 
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, p. 20, R. 180.) 
31. As a demonstrator, Mr. Tyler was responsible for bringing his own 
equipment. The store did not provide anything but the product to be demonstrated, which 
Market Source West had to purchase. (Id. at 12, R. 181; Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 
22, R. 209.) 
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32. Mr. Tyler had minimal interactions with store employees and operated 
autonomously of the store as a third-party demonstrator. (Deposition of Stephen Tyler, 
pp. 20, 23, 28, R. 176-177, 180; Deposition of Chuck Brown, pp. 10, 22, R. 209, 213.) 
33. Because Mr. Tyler was not an employee of the store, Smith's did not have 
any policies or procedures that it required Mr. Tyler to follow while demonstrating within 
the store. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 13, Addendum, Exhibit "D.") 
34. As a third-party demonstrator, Mr. Tyler was never supervised by any of the 
various different grocery store chains such as Smith's, Wal-Mart, Macey's, and 
Albertson's, and the store employees of those various grocery chains never checked on 
Mr. Tyler to confirm that he had cleaned his demonstration area prior to his departure. 
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 38-40, R. 172-174.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
L The law in Utah pertaining to slip and fall cases involving an unsafe 
condition of a temporary nature that was neither created by the storeowner nor known to 
be in existence by the storeowner requires that the plaintiff show that the storeowner had 
constructive knowledge of the unsafe temporary condition because the condition had 
existed long enough that the storeowner should have discovered it. Price was unable to 
show that Smith's had constructive knowledge of the water spill that led to Price's 
incident because there is no evidence as to how long the water spill was on the floor prior 
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to Price's incident. Consequentially, the trial court correctly granted Smith's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
II. The law in Utah makes it clear that the trier of fact cannot be permitted to 
speculate that a defendant is negligent. The trial court correctly granted Smith's Motion 
for Summary Judgment because there is no evidence that Smith's was negligeut. With 
absolutely no evidence, Price relies exclusively on speculation and conjecture regarding 
the origin of the water spill on which Price slipped and fell as well as how long the water 
spill was present on the floor prior to her incident. 
III. The trial court was correct in granting Smith's Motion for Summary 
Judgment because there is no evidence that Smith's ever delegated its duty to maintain its 
store in a reasonably safe condition to a third-party demonstrator from Market Source 
who was demonstrating deli meats and cheeses on the day of the incident. There is also 
no evidence that Market Source was an independent contractor retained by Smith's to 
maintain or repair Smith's premises. Finally, there is no evidence that the demonstrator 
was the origin of the water spill. 
IV. Smith's satisfied its duty to maintain its store in a reasonably safe condition 
on the day of the incident. Smith's did not create the water spill on which Plaintiff 
slipped and fell at approximately 5:00 p.m. and was not on notice of the spill's presence 
prior to the incident. Furthermore, Smith's performed eight formal floor inspections from 
4:24 p.m. to 4:58 p.m. and four additional formal floor inspections in the five o'clock 
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hour. With no evidence that Smith's failed to meet its duty to maintain its store in a 
reasonably safe condition on the day of the incident, the trial court was correct in granting 
Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED APPELLEE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF HOW LONG THE 
TEMPORARY HAZARD WAS IN EXISTENCE PRIOR TO THE 
INCIDENT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held: "A major purpose of summary judgment is to 
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder." Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). Similarly, the United States 
Supreme Court held in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986): 
"Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural 
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, that are designed to 
'secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Id. at 327; 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Summary 
disposition of lawsuits is a valuable and necessary tool in a judicial system such as ours, 
which strives for the efficient and timely resolution of legal disputes."). 
Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 
appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions establish that 
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there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. Subsection (e) of Rule 56 further provides: 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
UTAH. R. CIV. P. 56(e). 
The United States Supreme Court has clarified this provision with respect to Rule 
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical to the Utah rule. 
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment 
. . . based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself 
not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakenly favors one side or the 
other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff 
on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in 
support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be 
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. The 
judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors 
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to 
a verdict.... 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held "that property owners are not insurers of the 
safety of those who come upon their property, even though they are business invitees." 
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Merely proving that an 
accident occurred on the store's premises is insufficient to show that the store owner is 
liable for the accident. Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
13 
In Jex v. JRA, Inc., the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that slip and fall cases fall 
under two different categories: those involving an unsafe condition of a temporary nature 
and those involving an unsafe condition of a permanent nature. Jex, 166 P.3d 655, 658 
(Utah Ct. App. 2007). The Utah Court of Appeals held: 
Under the temporary condition theory, a plaintiff can only recover if the 
defendant has notice of the dangerous condition. Specifically, the 
following two conditions must be satisfied: (1) "that [the defendant] had 
knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge [ ] or 
constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that 
he should have discovered it; and [(2)] that after such knowledge, sufficient 
time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied 
it." 
Id. (quoting Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975)). 
In the present matter, Price has conceded that Smith's did not create the water spill 
and therefore the present matter falls under the temporary condition theory framework. 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 10, Addendum, Exhibit "B.") Price has also conceded that Smith's 
did not have actual notice of the water spill. (Id., Addendum, Exhibit "B.") As a result, 
Price must show that Smith's had constructive notice of the temporary hazard prior to 
Price's incident in order to maintain her negligence claim. However, Price has failed to 
meet her burden of proof and therefore her claim fails as correctly decided by the trial 
court. 
There is no evidence that Smith's had constructive notice and should have known 
about the water spill prior to the incident because no one knows how long the water spill 
had been on the floor prior to Price's fall. When asked how long the water had been on 
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the floor prior to her fall, Price testified that she had "no idea" and that it would be 
speculation on her part. (Deposition of Judy Price, p. 35, R. 218.) When Price's 
granddaughter, Ms. Chance, was asked if she knew how long the spill had been on the 
floor prior to Price's fall, she responded "no." (Deposition of Judy Chance, p. 33, R. 
201.) Similarly, Smith's does not know how long the water had been on the floor prior to 
Price's fail. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 46, R. 425; p. 45, R. 426.) 
It is extremely difficult to guess how long the water spill was on the floor prior to 
the incident because no one knows the origin of the spill. When Price was asked how the 
water came to be on the floor, she responded: "I didn't know there was water on the floor, 
so how could I know how it got there?" (Deposition of Judy Price, p. 36, R. 217.) Ms. 
Chance also testified that she did not know how the water came to be on the floor. 
(Deposition of Judy Chance, p. 33, R. 201.) When Smith's store director, Mr. Brown, 
initially saw the water spill following the accident, he too could not figure out the origin 
of the water spill though he later guessed that the Market Source demonstrator, Stephen 
Tyler, spilled the water. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 32, 37, 44-45, R. 207-208, 426-
427.) However, Mr. Brown's guess that the Market Source demonstrator spilled the 
water was only speculation and has been eliminated as a possibility by Mr. Tyler, who 
testified unequivocally at his deposition that he did not even have water nor did he spill 
water while at the store on the day of the incident. (Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 21-
22, 28, 42, R. 171,176,178-179.) 
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Of course, even if Mr. Brown's after-the-fact speculation was considered adequate 
evidence to identify the origin of the spill, which it is not, Price still has no evidence as to 
how long the water spill was on the floor prior to the incident. Price must add yet another 
level of speculation on top of the previous conjecture. Even then, the result does not 
support Price's argument for constructive notice. Price again relies on the guesses of Mr. 
Brown who testified that if Mr. Tyler left at 5:00 p.m. and the spill was caused at that 
time, then at the longest, the spill would have been present on the floor for 10 minutes. 
(Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 45, R. 426.) Mr. Brown did not see, hear, or in any way 
observe the spilling of the water. All of this speculation is strenuously denied by Mr. 
Tyler who adamantly testified that he did not spill any water on the day of the incident. 
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 21-22, 28, 42, R. 171, 176, 178-179.) 
Based on Mr. Brown's speculation, however, the 10 minute estimate is the longest 
period of time the water could have been present on the floor. The water in fact could 
have been present just minutes or even seconds before Plaintiffs incident based on the 
guesses made by Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown's guesses as to the origin of the water spill or 
the time the water was on the floor prior to Plaintiffs incident is unsupported conjecture 
that is inadequate in satisfying the constructive notice requirement within the temporary 
condition theory framework. 
In her brief, Price cites to Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 753 (Utah 
1977) and argues that a plaintiff can still meet her burden of proof in instances where only 
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tenuous facts exist as to the length of time the temporary hazard has been present. In 
Ohlson, a store patron was injured from slipping and falling on dry spaghetti on the floor 
of a grocery store. Unlike the present matter, however, the Ohlson case enjoyed abundant 
evidence supporting a finding that the temporary hazard had been in existence for a 
considerable period of time prior to the incident. In distinguishing the case from others in 
which there was a lack of evidence that the temporary hazard had been present for any 
appreciable time, the Utah Supreme Court stressed: 
Here, the testimony was that the spaghetti was dirty, crushed, broken into 
small pieces, and that it extended from aisle ten around the end of that aisle 
into the main aisle for five or six feet toward the cash register at the front of 
the store. 
The only inspection of the area made by defendant's employees in the 45 
minutes prior to plaintiffs injury was a casual glance down the aisle made 
by defendant's manager as he came on duty, even though defendant knew 
that the time at which the injury occurred was the busiest time for the store; 
that more customers were present during that time; that debris was more 
likely to find its way to the floor during this time; and that the debris Cciused 
the kind of injury suffered by the plaintiff here. The main aisle in which 
some of the spaghetti was strewn was visible from the positions of 
employees at the cash register. 
Ohlson, 568 P.2d at 754-755. 
In the present matter, Price may not cite to any of the factors identified by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the Ohlson decision to bolster her case. In Ohlson, the actual nature of 
the spaghetti at the time of the incident indicated that it had been present on the floor for a 
considerable period of time. The spaghetti was dirty, crushed, broken into small pieces, 
and spread over a substantial area of the store floor. In contrast, the water spill in the 
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present matter provides absolutely no hint into how long it was on the floor prior to 
Price's fall. There is no evidence that the water spill was dirty or had been traveled 
through which might imply its presence on the floor for some meaningful period of time. 
In Ohlson, the Utah Supreme Court stressed that only a single casual glance down 
the aisle in which the spaghetti lay had been made in the 45 minutes before the incident. 
However, in the present matter, Smith's had undertaken 12 formal floor inspections from 
4:24 p.m. to 5:57 p.m. on the day of the incident, which took place at 5:00 p.m. or shortly 
thereafter. The formal floor inspections took place at 4:24 p.m., 4:26 p.m., 4:29 p.m., 
4:33 p.m., 4:34 p.m., 4:43 p.m., 4:50 p.m., 4:58 p.m., 5:12 p.m., 5:38 p.m., 5:55 p.m., and 
5:57 p.m. (Floor Inspection Report, R. 187-193.) During none of these inspections was 
the water spill discovered. Furthermore, Mr. Tyler testified that he never saw anyone 
spill anything on the floor or observe any spill on the floor from noon until 5:00 p.m. 
when he left the store on the day of the incident. (Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 28, R. 
176.) 
Though Price does not address opinions of her supermarket safety expert, Kent 
Steele, in her argument, she does refer to his opinions in the Statement of Facts section as 
well as the Summary of Argument section of her brief. At the time Smith's motion for 
summary judgment was heard, Smith's also had an outstanding motion in limine in which 
it requested that the trial court preclude Mr. Steele from testifying at trial. In its decision, 
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the trial court stated that its decision to grant Smith's summary judgment rendered moot 
Smith's motion in limine. (Decision, R. 538.) 
In her brief. Price states that Mr. Steele opined that "demonstration areas are 
typical areas to anticipate spillage" and that "Smith's conduct fell below the standard of 
care because Smith's failed to verify that Pyggy [Mr. Tyler] left the demonstration area 
clean and spill free when Pyggy checked out." (Brief of Appellant, p. 5, Addendum, 
Exhibit "B.") However, Mr. Steele's opinions that Price cites in her brief do not change 
the fact that Price is unable to identify free from speculation the amount of time the water 
was on the floor. As a result, Plaintiff is unable to satisfy the constructive notice 
requirement of the temporary condition theory framework established by Utah appellate 
courts. As the trial court stated in its decision: 
The lack of evidence regarding the length of time the puddle had been on 
the floor when Plaintiff slipped is analogous to that of Jex. The fact that 
Mr. Steele believes that Smith's should have inspected Mr. Tyler's area 
upon his departure does not overcome the fatal flaw that Plaintiff has shown 
no evidence of the length of time the puddle was on the floor. In the 
absence of any such evidence, this court is unable to impute constructive 
notice to Smith's regarding the presence of the water puddle on the floor. 
(Decision, R. 533-534.) 
In the present matter, there is no evidence in support of constructive notice. There 
is no evidence as to who created the spill or how long the water spill was on the store 
floor prior to Plaintiffs incident. There is only evidence that Smith's conducted 12 
formal floor inspections from 4:24 p.m. to 5:57 p.m. and never discovered the water spill, 
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as well as Mr. Tyler's testimony that during his stay from noon to 5:00 p.m. he never saw 
any spill on the store floor. The Utah Supreme Court has stressed: 
The mere presence of a slippery spot on a floor does not in and of itself 
establish negligence. This condition may arise in any place of business for 
any number of reasons. Proof that a slippery or wet substance was on a 
floor, does not, without more, establish that defendant knew or should have 
known of the condition. 
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Having failed to produce evidence that Smith's should have known about the spill, 
Price is unable to meet the first prong in Jex, which is necessary in order for Smith's to be 
found negligent under the temporary condition theory framework. Therefore, the trial 
court was correct in granting Smith's motion for summary judgment. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED APPELLEE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ARE 
BASED ON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the trier of fact cannot be permitted to 
speculate that a defendant is negligent. In a case where there was only speculation 
regarding the origin of an alleged hazard, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed summary 
judgment in the defendant's favor. Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co,, 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 
1955). In Lindsay, a coffee shop patron was injured after slipping on water on the coffee 
shop floor. Even though it was established that a waitress had delivered water in glasses 
to plaintiff and her companion, there was no evidence as to whether the waitress, the 
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plaintiff, her companion, or another patron spilled the water on the floor, or exactly when 
it was spilled, or whether the management knew of its existence. Under these facts, the 
Supreme Court of Utah ruled that: 
[T]here was no evidence as to how the water got onto the floor, by whom it 
was deposited, exactly when it arrived there or that the defendant had 
knowledge of its presence. Under such circumstances, a jury cannot be 
permitted to speculate that the defendant was negligent, 
Lindsay, 284 P.2d at 478 (Utah 1955) (emphasis added). 
Regrettably, Price was injured from slipping on a water spill found within the 
Smith's store. That does not automatically mean that Smith's is at fault. See Dwiggins v. 
Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) (holding that "[bjare allegations of 
negligence unsupported by facts . . . are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment"). Price has conceded that Smith's did not cause the water spill and that 
Smith's was not aware of the spill's presence prior to the incident. (Brief of Appellant, p. 
10, Addendum, Exhibit "B.") Without evidence that Smith's should have been aware of 
the spill's presence, the trial court could not permit a jury to speculate that Smith's was 
somehow negligent for Plaintiffs unfortunate accident. Because "a jury cannot be 
permitted to speculate that [Smith's] was negligent," the trial court's order granting 
Smith's summary judgment motion should be upheld. Lindsay, 284 P.2d at 478 (Utah 
1955). 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED APPELLEE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE SMITH'S NEVER DELEGATED ITS DUTY TO 
USE REASONABLE CARE TO MAINTAIN ITS STORE IN A 
REASONABLY SAFE CONDITION. 
Smith's does not dispute that as the storeowner Smith's possessed a duty to use 
reasonable care to maintain its store in a reasonably safe condition. However, Smith's 
never delegated to Market Source a nondelegable duty to use reasonable care to maintain 
its store in a reasonably safe condition. In fact, Smith's did not delegate anything to 
Market Source, which was neither employed, retained, nor paid by Smith's to demonstrate 
deli meat and cheeses on the day of the incident. 
Under Utah law, a storeowner possesses a duty to use reasonable care to maintain 
its store in a reasonably safe condition. This duty does not impose upon a storeowner 
strict liability for every incident that takes place within its store's walls. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held 'that property owners are not insurers of the safety of those who 
come upon their property, even though they are business invitees." Martin v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). As previously addressed, the Utah 
appellate courts have clarified the duty a storeowner possesses to reasonably maintain its 
store as it pertains to temporary hazards. The Utah Court of Appeals had held: 
Under the temporary condition theory, a plaintiff can only recover if the 
defendant has notice of the dangerous condition. Specifically, the 
following two conditions must be satisfied: (1) "that [the defendant] had 
knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge [ ] or 
constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that 
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he should have discovered it; and [(2)] that after such knowledge, sufficient 
time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied 
it." 
Jex v. JRA, Inc., 166 P.3d 655, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Allen v. Federated 
Daiiy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975)). 
As addressed above, Price is unable to satisfy the constructive notice requirement 
found within the temporary condition theory framework. Price has conceded that Smith's 
did not create the water spill and that it did not have actual notice of the spill prior to the 
incident. (Brief of Appellant, p. 10, Addendum, Exhibit "B.") There is also no evidence 
that Smith's possessed constructive notice of the water spill because there is no evidence, 
free of speculation, as to how long the spill was on the floor prior to the incident. 
It is undisputed that Smith's never saw the water spill despite performing 12 
formal floor inspections from 4:24 p.m. to 5:57 p.m. on the day of the incident. (Floor 
Inspection Report, R. 187-193.) It is also undisputed that Mr. Tyler testified that he never 
spilled water, never saw anyone else spill anything on the floor, and that he did not see 
any spills on the floor while he was present at the store from noon to 5:00 p.m. on the day 
of the incident. (Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 28, R. 176.) Based on the foregoing, 
Smith's may not be found liable under the temporary condition theory recognized by Utah 
appellate courts. 
In her brief, Price has emphasized the following statement from Prosser: "It is 
generally agreed that the obligation as to the condition of the premises is of such 
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importance that it cannot be delegated, and that the occupier will be liable for the 
negligence of an independent contractor to whom he entrusts maintenance and repair." 
Prosser, Law of Torts, § 395 (1971). This assertion might be of some significance if 
hypothetically Smith's had retained Market Source to undertake construction, repair, or 
maintenance of the store's premises. Smith's, however, never retained Market Source to 
do anything and certainly did not entrust Mr. Tyler with the maintenance or repair of its 
floor. 
Market Source's lack of relationship to Smith's helps clarify that Smith's did not 
entrust maintenance of its floor to Mr. Tyler on the day of the incident. Market Source 
was not an independent contractor that Smith's retained to perform construction, 
maintenance, or repair services. Instead, Market Source was a demonstration company 
that was retained by vendors or manufacturers of various products to demonstrate those 
products within grocery stores. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 7, Addendum, Exhibit 
"D.") Market Source was paid by the vendor or manufacture that retained Market Source 
to demonstrate the product. Therefore, on the day of the incident, Market Source was not 
paid by Smith's to do anything. Instead, Market Source was paid by the vendor or 
manufacturer of the deli meats and cheeses that were demonstrated. (Id. at 19, 
Addendum, Exhibit "D.") Akin to a customer, at the conclusion of its demonstration, 
Market Source paid Smith's for the product that was demonstrated. (Id. at 10, 
Addendum, Exhibit "D.") 
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Mr. Tyler was employed by Market Source and was not employed by Smith's. 
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 6-7, R. 183-184.) Mr. Tyler was not compensated by 
Smith's in any way on the day of the incident. Instead, he was paid by Markel Source. 
{Id. at 32, R. 175.) Because he was a Market Source demonstrator and was not employed 
or retained by Smith's, Mr. Tyler had minimal interactions with Smith's and operated 
autonomously of the store. {Id. at 20, 23, 28, R. 176-177, 180; Deposition of Chuck 
Brown, pp. 10, 22, R. 209, 213.) Simply put, Mr. Tyler was another customer of Smith's 
who paid for product that he in turn gave away to other customers patronizing Smith's. 
The trial court correctly concluded: 
The undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that Mr. Tyler was neither 
an employee nor an agent of Smith's at the time of the accident. In her 
memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff conceded for purposes of this motion 
that Mr. Tyler was not an employee of Smith's and that he was not 
compensated by Smith's in any way. However, even if Plaintiff had not 
conceded this point, it is clear from the depositions of Mr. Brown and Mr. 
Tyler that Mr. Tyler was employed by Market Source at the time of the 
accident and has never been employed by Smith's. Nor is there any 
evidence that Mr. Tyler had apparent or actual authority to act in behalf of 
Smith's, thereby becoming its agent. 
(Decision, R. 532.) 
Despite this relationship between Smith's and Mr. Tyler in which Mr. Tyler did 
not act as an employee or agent for Smith's, Price incorrectly claims that Smith's 
delegated the duty of maintaining or cleaning its floor to Mr. Tyler. Price relies on the 
deposition testimony of Mr. Brown who stated that the store expected the demonstrator to 
clean up after he had concluded his demonstration. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 22, 
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R. 209.) This testimony, particularly when it is placed in context, is insufficient to 
support Price's claim that Smith's delegated the duty of maintaining its floor to Mr. Tyler. 
Mr. Tyler was not an employee or agent of Smith's. Mr. Tyler did not work for a 
floor maintenance company that was retained by Smith's. Instead, on the day of the 
accident, Mr. Tyler was demonstrating deli meats and cheeses to Smith's customers. Mr. 
Brown testified that Market Source was not even hired or retained by Smith's. He 
certainly did not testify that Market Source had been retained to perform any maintenance 
on Smith's floors. There is absolutely no evidence that Smith's retained Market Source to 
wax, service, repair, inspect or clean Smith's floors. 
Smith's did not delegate any absolute duty to Market Source. Smith's continued to 
use reasonable care to maintain its store in a reasonably safe condition as reflected in 
Smith's conduct. On the day of the incident, Smith's performed 12 formal floor 
inspections to check for any potential temporary hazards on its floors from 4:24 p.m. to 
5:57 p.m. (Floor Inspection Report, R. 187-193.) 
In her brief, Price has cited to a number of decisions within Utah in which Utah 
appellate courts have referred to the concept of "nondelegable duty." However, none of 
these decisions are relevant to the present matter because Smith's never delegated its 
nondelegable duty to Market Source. Furthermore, in those decisions in which Utah 
appellate courts found a nondelegable duty, the appellate courts proceeded to analyze the 
cases based on the legal framework associated with the duty in question. In the present 
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matter, the legal framework associated with the nondelegable duty Smith's owed to its 
business invitees is the temporary condition theory as outlined in the Jex opinion. Where 
Plaintiff is unable to show constructive notice, Smith's may not be found liable. 
In her brief, Price also has cited to a number of cases outside of Utah in which 
courts have held storeowners liable for the negligence of independent contractors they 
have specifically retained to perform maintenance or repair work in their stores: 
Lilienthal v. Hastings Clothing Co., 280 P.2d 824, 828 (Cal App. 155) (maintenance 
contractor charged with waxing the store's floors); Gill v. Krassner, 11 A.2d 462 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950) (maintenance contractor charged with waxing the store's 
floors); Goodman v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 129 A.2d 405 (D.C. App. 1957) (construction 
company charged with performing construction work to store); Daly v. Bergstedt, 126 
N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1964) (altercation contractor charged with store remodel): Lipman 
Wolfe & Co. v. Teeples & Thatcher, Inc., 522 P.2d 467 (Or. 1974) (independent 
contractor charged with repair of occupier's premises); Bryant v. Sherm 's Thunder bird 
Market, 522 P.2d 1383 (Or. 1974) (contractor hired to install refrigeration cases in store); 
Huddleson v. Lerman, 73 A.2d 596 (N J. Super. 1950) (contractor retained to wax store's 
floor); Little v. Butner, 348 P.2d 1022 (Kan. 1960) (employee of occupier created hazard 
through meat sample demonstration). None of the decisions are even remotely relevant 
to the present matter because Market Source was never retained, employed, or acted as an 
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agent on behalf of Smith's. Furthermore, Market Source was not charged by Smith's 
with performing any maintenance or repair work within the Smith's store. 
If Price is successful in broadening vicarious liability of a storeowner to cover all 
possible negligence performed within its store by all third persons, regardless of whether 
the third persons are employees or agents of the store or retained to perform maintenance 
or repair work at the store and regardless of the store having notice of the temporary 
hazard created, Smith's and every other storeowner will essentially be held strictly liable 
for every incident that takes place within store walls. That is expressly not the law in 
Utah. The Supreme Court of Utah has held "that property owners are not insurers of the 
safety of those who come upon their property, even though they are business invitees." 
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Merely proving that an 
accident occurred on the store's premises is insufficient to show that the store owner is 
liable for the accident. Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Price's nondelegable duty argument is also thwarted from the lack of evidence that 
Mr. Tyler created the temporary hazard. There is no evidence identifying the origin of the 
water spill. Price and her granddaughter both admitted that they did not know who 
caused the spill. (Deposition of Judy Price, p. 36, R. 217; Deposition of Judy Chance, pp. 
33-34, R. 200-201.) Plaintiff is relying exclusively on the after-the-fact guess Mr. Brown 
made in deposition that Mr. Tyler was the source of the spill. However, Mr. Brown's 
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guess was mere conjecture and speculation that was resolved as incorrect by Mr. Tyler 
who stressed that he did not have, nor did he spill, any water on the day of the incident. 
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 21-22, 28, 42, R. 171, 176, 178-179.) 
With no evidence supporting a finding that Market Source was an agent for 
Smith's, that Smith's entrusted Market Source with the maintenance of its floors, or that 
Market Source was the source of the water spill, Price's nondelegable duty argument fails 
and the trial court was correct in granting Smith's motion for summary judgment. 
IV. 
SMITH'S SATISFIED ITS DUTY TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO 
MAINTAIN ITS STORE IN A REASONABLY SAFE CONDITION. 
As a storeowner, Smith's possesses a duty to use reasonable care in maintaining its 
store in a reasonably safe condition. On the day of the incident, Smith's satisfied this 
duty and therefore may not be held liable for Price's unfortunate incident. 
In addition to a culture of cleanliness and maintenance, Smith's has a formal 
policy of inspecting its store floors at least once every hour to make certain that the store 
is free from temporary hazards. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, pp. 16-17, R. 210-211.) 
Price's incident took place at approximately 5:00 p.m. (Deposition of Judy Price, p. 19, 
R. 224; Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 44, R. 427.) From 4:24 p.m. to 4:58 p.m. on the 
day of the incident, Smith's performed eight formal floor inspections (4:24 p.m., 4:26 
p.m., 4:29 p.m., 4:33 p.m., 4:34 p.m., 4:43 p.m., 4:50 p.m., 4:58 p.m.) during which 
Smith's employees walked through the entire store looking for temporary haz<irds on the 
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floor that could be remedied. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, pp. 16-17, R. 210-211; Floor 
Inspection Report, R. 187-193.) During the five o'clock hour, Smith's conducted another 
four formal floor inspections (5:12 p.m., 5:38 p.m., 5:55 p.m., 5:57 p.m.). (Floor 
Inspection Report, R. 187-193.) 
The mere fact that an incident took place at Smith's does not mean that Smith's 
was negligent. The Utah Supreme Court has stressed: 
As previously noted, a store owner is charged with the duty to use 
reasonable care in maintaining the floors of his or her establishment. This 
court's comments in Long are equally applicable to the case at hand: "[I]f 
[the store owner's] duty required further safety measures, we are made to 
wonder . . . how far the defendant would have to go in protecting the 
customers, both in method and in area. There does not appear to be any 
reasonable and practical answer to that inquiry." Long v. Smith Food King 
Store, 531 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973). 
As this court has often stated in other cases, it is regrettable that plaintiff 
suffered injuries. However, "[n]ot every accident that occurs gives rise to a 
cause of action upon which the party injured may recover damages from 
someone. Thousands of accidents occur every day for which no one is liable 
in damages, and often no one is to blame, not even the ones who are 
injured." Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah 1977). 
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 479-480 (Utah 1996). 
On the day of the incident Smith's was cognizant of its duty to reasonably maintain 
the store premises in a reasonably safe condition and took consistent safety measures to 
satisfy its duty as evidenced by the 12 fomial floor inspections undertaken from 4:24 p.m. 
to 5:57 p.m. While it is unfortunate that Price was involved in an incident involving a 
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water spill of unknown origin that had been on the floor for an unknown period of time, 
there is absolutely no evidence that Smith's was negligent or liable for the incident. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing. Defendant and Appellee, Smith's Food & Drug Centers, 
Inc., respectfully requests that the Order of the Trial Court granting Smith's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Order of Final Judgment be affirmed, the appeal of Price be 
dismissed, and Smith's be awarded its costs on appeal. 
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day of May, 2010. 
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES, L.C. 
Todd C. Hilbig 
Stephen F. Edwards 
Attorneys for Appellant and Defendant Smiths 
Food & Drug Centers, Inc. 
32 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on thisJ?Q day of May, 2010,1 caused two (2) true and correct 
copies of BRIEF OF APPELLEE SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, INC. to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Westlaw. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 Page 1 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
*S_Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*S Part VII. Judgment 
-• RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole 
case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts 
exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to 
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be 
conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the 
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may 
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 Page 2 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented m bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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hip injury that requires surgery. Mrs. Price brought several causes of action against 
Smith's but appeals only in regard to two of those causes: first, that the store was 
negligent when it failed to inspect an area of the store where it had allowed an 
independent contractor to work for the day; and second, that the store should be 
vicariously liable for the negligence of the independent contractor for causing the 
hazardous puddle. The Fourth District Court for the State of Utah granted Smith's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on both counts mentioned above concluding as a matter 
of law that, under either theory of liability, Mrs. Price would be unable to recover. 
The issues before this court are, first, whether Mrs. Price presented sufficient 
evidence of the length of time the water was on the floor to establish constructive notice; 
and second, whether the store can be vicariously liable for the negligence of an in-store 
food demonstrator (independent contractor) for harm to Mrs. Price caused by the 
demonstrator's failure to clean up the floor after the demonstration. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 2, 2005, Steven Tyler, an employee of a food demonstrator Pyggy, Inc., 
d.b.a. Market Source West., (hereinafter "Pyggy") spent the day handing out meat and 
cheese to customers in Smith's American Fork store. R. 248. Pyggy brought its own 
demonstration equipment and table, but purchased the food samples from Smith's. R. 
247. 
3 
298. Mr. Brown concluded this because Ms. Price fell at the site of the demonstration 
table, and because he noticed a cup of water on the demonstration table when he went to 
talk to Mr. Tyler earlier in the day. R. 298. Mr. Brown stated he was almost 100% sure 
the water came from Mr. Tyler's table. R. 298. There is no other evidence suggesting 
any other source of the spilled water. R. 298, 426-27. 
Mr. Brown also testified that he thought the water was on the floor for maybe 10 
minutes. R. 301,278. 
Mr. Brown testified that the water was cleaned up easily with a paper towel. R. 
278-279.[ 
After the incident in which Ms. Price slipped and fell on the puddle of water, 
Pyggy went out of business and was found not to have insurance. Transcript of Oral 
Arguments at 25. 
Mrs. Price's supermarket safety expert, Kent Steele, opined that demonstration 
areas are typical areas to anticipate spillage. R. 254. Mr. Steele also opined that Smith's 
conduct fell below the standard of care because Smith's failed to verify that Pyggy left 
the demonstration area clean and spill free when Pyggy checked out. R. 252. 
Page 45 of Alan Brown's deposition was attached to Mrs. Price's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for summary Judgment but was not numbered as part of the paginated 
record. However, that page of Mr. Borwn's deposition fell between pages 279 and 279 of the 
paginated record. 
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sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have 
remedied it. 
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975). 
Here, since it is undisputed that Smith's did not create the water spill in the present 
matter, nor did it have actual notice of the water spill (R. 245), this brief discusses 
constructive notice as the basis of Smith's liability for ordinary negligence. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that even where there are only tenuous facts 
about the length of time the dangerous condition existed, the plaintiff can still meet her 
burden. Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 753 (Utah 1977) (where the court 
affirmed the trial court's determination that the jury could find constructive notice— 
evidence of the amount of time the dangerous condition existed—where the only 
evidence of the time the dangerous condition existed was^the condition of the broken 
spaghetti on the floor). 
In holding that Plaintiffs negligence claim (based on constructive notice) should 
fail, the trial court emphasized the importance of the time factor in determining whether 
constructive notice can be imputed to Smith's. R. 534. The trial court quoted the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in J ex v. JRA, Inc., 196 P.3d 576, 581 (Utah 2008): 
To establish that a temporary condition existed long enough to give a store owner 
constructive notice of it, a plaintiff must present evidence that it had been there for 
an appreciable time. We have therefore imputed constructive notice to a store 
owner only when there is some evidence of the length of time the debris had been 
on the floor. 
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1 question. 
2 A. Okay. 
3 Q. And I'll assume that if you don't ask me to 
4 reask the question that you understood the question. Is 
5 that fair? 
6 A. Yeah. Yes. 
7 Q. Perfect. Did you review any documents in 
8 preparation for this deposition7 
9 A . No. 
0 Q. Okay. I imagine that you didn't speak with 
1 anyone about this deposition7 
2 A . No. 
3 Q. Okay. Steve, do you keep a journal or diary7 
4 A. No, I don't. 
5 Q. So you wouldn't have any journal or diary 
6 entries regarding the event that took place on April 2nd, 
7 2005? 
8 A . No. 
9 Q . Okay. Just some real ly quick background 
>0 in format ion . Could you give m e your full name? 
!1 A . Yes , S teven Lee Ty ler . 
12 Q. Okay. And your current address? 
13 A . 750 South 650 West, Apartment 362, Provo, 
14 Utah 84601 . 
15 Q. And, Steve, who resides there with you? 
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1 A. My wife and my daughter and me. 
2 Q. Okay. And your date and place of birth? 
3 A . Washington — Bellingham, Washington. I was 
4 born October 8th, 1979. 
5 Q. Okay. Steve, could you give me your 
6 educational background? Did you graduate from high 
7 school? 
8 A. Yeah, that's about it. 
9 Q. Where did you graduate from high school? 
L0 A. Ebo School District. 
11 Q. And then any education following that formal 
12 education? 
13 A. Just my truck driver's license, which was 
14 through Mountain West Trucking School. 
15 Q. Steve, let me ask you: Are you currently 
16 employed? 
17 A . Yes. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. I work for Yellow Cab of Provo. 
20 Q. How long nave you been working for Yellow 
2 1 Cab"? 
22 A. Just like a month or so, not very long. 
23 Q. And, Steve, on April 2nd, 2005, were you 
24 employed by Market Source West? 
25 A . Yes. 
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1 Q. Okay. How long--could you provide me with 
2 the approximate dates of your employment at Market Source 
3 West? 
4 A . Oh, gosh. I'd probably been there a year. 
5 So it would have been — oh, I can't remember, it's been 
6 such a long time. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A . 2004 sometime. I don't know. 
9 Q. So sometime in 2004 is when you began your 
10 work at Market Source West? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And when did you stop your employment at 
13 Market Source West? 
14 A . I t was actually shortly after that because my 
15 car got taken, so... 
16 Q. So shortly after April 2nd, 2005? 
17 A . Yeah, that is correct. I wish I had my 
18 resume, I would have been more efficient on the dates. 
19 Q. No, no. I appreciate that. 
20 Hey, Steve, have you ever been employed by 
21 Smith's? 
22 A . No. 
23 Q. Okay. What was your position at Market 
24 Source West? 
25 A . I was a self-employed demo-er. 
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1 Q. And could you tell me what your job duties 
2 entailed as a demo-er? 
3 A . Just basically sample out the food that they 
4 gave me to sample. So that day it was meat and cheese 
5 and... 
6 Q. Okay. Now, Steve, you mentioned you were a 
7 self-employed demo-er for — 
8 A . Well, yeah. We had W-9 Forms. 
9 Q. Okay. Who was your supervisor at Market 
10 Source West? 
11 A. Oh, goodness. That would have been — I 
12 can't remember her name. I t 's been, I mean, a few years. 
13 Q. Understood. And the name of the supervisor 
14 you had, is that a name that you could get through some 
15 documentation you have at home or in some way? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. No. Okay. 
18 A. I mean, not — I would have to happen to just 
19 like trip over something. That's the only way. 
20 Q. Steve, as a demo-er, what training did you 
21 receive? 
22 A. Zero training. 
23 Q. Okay. So you were — you began working on 
24 behalf of Market Source West and they just sent you out 
25 to demo? 
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A. Basically, yeah. 
Q. Okay 
A. Because they need people really bad alt the 
time. 
Q. Was there like a brief video that you watched 
for training, or did you tram with another individual 
briefly? 
A. Nothing. 
Q. No In the application process or the hiring 
process, did they provide you with a list of 
responsibilities that you would have7 
A. Yeah. I think they gave us like a little 
paper saying, you know, the clothes you have to wear, you 
know, stuff like that. 
Q. Okay. Would this paper have identified 
briefly what you're supposed to do as a demo-er? 
A. Yeah, very briefly. I mean, that's about it. 
Q. Would you have this paper? 
A . No. 
Q. No. Okay. 
A. I wish I did, but no. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever go out with another 
demo-er to demo things so that you saw what that person 
was doing? 
A. Huh-uh, no. 
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Q. As a demo-er, would you go to various stores 
or were you assigned a specific store? 
A. Anywhere. I could work anywhere in Utah 
County. I even worked in Salt Lake County a couple of 
times. I t just depends on where they need you. 
Q. Okay. But, primarily, you worked in Utah 
County? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Were you assigned to a particular grocery 
store chain? 
A . No. 
Q. So it could be any? 
A. I t could be any. I worked at Wal-Mart. I 
worked at Macey's. I t 's just wherever they have accounts 
through. 
Q. Okay. Do you know how many — let me ask: 
Was there a headquarters someplace that you would go to, 
or were you just simply called from your own home and 
sent directly to a different location? 
A. Yeah, we were called from our house and 
they'd send us the paperwork. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But it wasn't... 
Q. When they sent you paperwork, what would that 
Paperwork entail? 
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A. Just when and where we're supposed to be. 
And they'd let us know within 24 hours. 
Q. Would they let you know through this 
paperwork in 24 hours or would you receive a telephone 
call? 
A. We'd receive a telephone call, and then 
they'd send the paperwork and we'd have it, like, the 
next day. 
Q. Would the paperwork identify a contact at the 
grocery store? 
A. No. We knew, basically, who — we'd just 
talk to the manager. So it's just — you know. And they 
know, you know, like if it's in the grocery side, talk to 
the grocery manager. So it was just — there wasn't a 
certain person. 
Q. And with the call or the paperwork, would 
they identify briefly what you would be demo-ing? 
A . Yeah. 
Q. Okay. 
A . I t would say meat, cheeses or, you know, 
toilet — whatever. 
Q. Okay. Let me ask you: Did Market Source 
West provide you with any equipment to take when you 
would go demo-ing? 
A. An apron and bowtie. That's about it. 
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Q. Okay. An apron and a bowtie Who provided, 
like -- I'm assuming with demo-ing that sometimes you 
would be placing things on tables Would that be 
accurate? 
A . Yeah. 
Q. And who would provide the table? 
A . Oh, I did. 
Q. Okay So would that be through Market Source 
West or that was just your own table? 
A. That's my own table. Anything other than the 
apron and the bowtie, we had to do ourselves. So if I 
had to go buy something for it, tax write-off, but... 
Q. So you were responsible for everything 
necessary for demo-ing the product except for your 
uniform, which included a bowtie and an apron? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay. When you would go to a grocery store, 
was the grocery store responsible for anything but the 
product you would be demo-ing? 
A. No, not usually. I t would be a pretty rare 
occasion if they were. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Like, say you didn't have something and the 
store just happened to have it, you lucked out. But, no. 
Q. I see. So you were expected, as the demo-er, 
12 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
to bring everything necessary to demo the product7 
A . Right. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And on a rare occasion I forgot something, 
and they'd be kind enough to, like, lend me a tablecloth 
or something like that. 
Q. Okay. I see. 
A. Nothing substantial. 
Q. What were the things that you would 
generally — what was your work equipment that you would 
generally bring to a demo? A table? Would that be 
standard? 
A. A table is always standard. A tablecloth is 
always standard. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Gloves standard. That's about it. 
Q. Let me ask: Would you bring a cooler or 
something to keep the product that you were demoing cool 
if it required cooling? 
A. I f it required cooling. Or if they had — 
you know, like in the meats and cheese case, they had 
their case right there, so I just stuck it in their case. 
And it was just plain and simple. 
Q. Okay. Steve, because we're dealing with — 
and on a telephone call that we had where I identified 
13 
the purpose for this deposition, you're aware that this 
lawsuit involves an accident that took place at the 
American Fork Smith's store on April 2nd, 2005? 
A. Right, yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you have an independent 
recollection of that day? 
A. I know I left at 5:00, and I know I came at 
12:00. 
Q. Okay. So you came at 12:00 and you left at 
5:00. Do you remember anything else? I mean, do you 
remember what you were assigned to demo? 
A. Yeah, it was meats and cheese. I don't 
remember exactly what — yeah, I don't. I don't remember 
what meats and what cheeses I did, but... 
Q. Okay. Let me ask you — so you received — 
you received paperwork or a telephone call to go to that 
American Fork Smith's on April 2nd, 2005? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Had you ever worked at that American Fork 
Smith's before? 
A. I don't think before then, huh-uh. 
Q. Had you worked at that store after this day, 
April 2nd, 2005? 
A. Huh-uh. 
Q. So you worked at American Fork Smith's on one 
14 
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occasion? 
A . Yeah. 
Q. Okay. How did you know that you arnved at 
the store at 12:00? 
A. Because that's the standard time we always 
arrived. j 
Q. Oh, okay. 
A. And we always left — the longest shift we 
had was five hours. So it's pretty set down that we 
leave — we come at this time and we leave at this time. 
I t would be very rare to get a morning demo, so... j 
Q. Okay. And so do you have an independent 
recollection of arriving at 12:00 and leaving at 5:00, or 
are you just assuming that that was the case because that 
was the usual? 
A. No, that's when I was there. I just... 
Q. So you arrive at the Smith's at 12:00. What 
do you do when you get to the store7 i 
A. We find the manager we need to do and we find 
the product, we count it, and then we just start our 
demo. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Set up our table. 
Q. Do you recall finding the manager on this 
date? 
15 
A. I don't think I did that date. I just went 
to the meat counter. And I don't think — I think I just 
talked to the deli, and they already knew that that's 
what was going to go on, so... 
Q. Okay. And they give you product? 
A. Yeah, they weigh it out. 
Q. Let me ask: What is it that -- why do you 
have an independent recollection of this particular day? 
Is there something that — 
A. Yeah, my car got repossessed on that 
particular day. 
Q. Oh, okay. So your car was repossessed? 
A. After, on the way home. 
Q. Okay. 
A . Yeah, that's why I remember that day. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Unfortunately, that was not a good day for 
me. 
Q. No, understood. The car was repossessed. 
Was it repossessed in the Smith's parking lot? 
A. No, I was driving home and I was almost home 
and — yeah. 
Q. Okay. So you go to the meat counter, you're 
given product — meat product, then — did you say you 
count the product? 
16 
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A. Well, we counted the product before we 
started to see how much we sell. 
Q. Okay And then set up On this day, do you 
recall what you set up7 
A. The table and the tablecloth. 
Q. Okay 
A. There wasn't anything else, really, to set 
up. 
Q. Would you have brought a cooler on that day7 
A. Nor because I knew I had the cold case that I 
could put the meat in. 
Q. Anything other than a table, tablecloth7 I'm 
wondering, do you provide like paper plates or napkins or 
things like that7 
A. They give us toothpicks to sample stuff. 
Q. And is that provided by Smith's7 
A. No, that's from the demo company, I think. 
Q. I see 
A. Or we buy them ourselves. I can't remember 
if they were the ones that the demo company gave me or if 
I bought them myself. 
Q. Where did you set up — and, you know, Tyler 
I apologize, I didn't bring a blank piece of paper. Or 
actually, I've got a whole stack of it 
MR. YOUNG: I can get one without lines if 
17 
you need it. 
MR. EDWARDS: I don't think there's a need 
Q. (BY MR. EDWARDS) Would you mind drawing a 
bird's eye view of the store7 And what I'm interested in 
is you identifying where you set up this table to demo on 
that day Do you remember7 
A. I t was right in front of the deli counter. 
Like, here's the deli counter and then you have — I set 
my table out like a few feet from there just so it was 
easy access, so I wouldn't have to move around as much. 
Q. So would you have sat the table where 
customers would generally go to purchase meat or things 
like that7 
A. Yeah. I was out like a foot or so from the 
counter. So they could get in if they needed to buy the 
meat that I was demo-mg. 
Q. Okay Could someone go past you and still 
select something at the counter7 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. Or did you block their — 
A. Oh, no, I didn't block their process at all. 
Q. Do you recall the store enough that you could 
just identify the rough location of where that — of 
where that meat counter would have been in the store, or 
no7 
18 
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A. Gosh, I'm trying to think. 
Q. And we don't need you to guess If you have 
a good idea, that would be helpful If you can't 
remember --
A. I can't remember exactly where it was at. 
Q. Okay 
A. I know it was like in the front doors 
somewhere, just past the front doors. 
Q. So you're stationed right in front of the 
meat counter^ 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay And were you at the end -- were you 
stationed in front of the meat counter, just at the end 
of one of the meat — my goodness, I'm rambling Let me 
ask that question again 
A. No problem. 
Q. You were in front of the meat counter Were 
you at one of the ends of the meat counter7 
A. I was basically in the center of it. 
Q. Okay You were in the center of it7 
A. Yeah. 
Q. When you looked out from your demo table, 
what were you looking at7 
A. I think it was the produce — 
Q. Okay. So you're stationed — 
19 
A. — If I remember correctly. 
Q. Okay. Right in front of the meat counter far 
enough away, though, that individuals could go — 
A. Yeah. 
Q. — around you and order things at the meat 
counter7 And you were looking, you believe, at the 
produce area7 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Did any Smith's employee assist in 
setting up your demo table7 
A. No, they never do. 
Q. Okay. You talked to someone at the meat 
counter to get the product7 
A- The product. 
Q, Okay. You didn't talk to anyone else about, 
"Hey, I'm here. Where do you want me7" 
A . No. 
Q. Did the meat people tell you where to set up 
the table or was that your choice7 
A. That's my choice. 
Q. Okay. 
A. They don't have much say in what we do, they 
just give us the product. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I mean, sometimes a store manager will come 
20 
L and say, "Hey, you know, you can't be there." But, no, 
I it doesn't really happen. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. Usually it's our say, what happens. 
5 Q. Do you have a chair? 
5 A . No. 
7 Q. No. So you've got a table, tablecloth. Do 
3 you put mats down, or no? 
9 A . No. 
0 Q. Steve, was there — did you need water for 
1 the demo that you were undertaking that day? Would water 
2 have been a — 
3 A . Not at all. 
4 Q. -- component? 
5 A . Not to my knowledge. 
6 Q. Let me ask: When you go to these demos for 
7 five hours, do you take like — do you take like a lunch 
8 o r -
9 A. Yeah, we get a half-hour lunch. 
0 Q. Okay. 
1 A . And then... 
2 Q. You don't eat the lunch right at the demo 
3 station, do you? 
14 A. No, no, no. That's against — yeah. 
15 Q. Is that against the rule? 
21 
1 A. Yeah. You can't eat — you close up your 
2 table and you go. You either can leave the store or you 
3 go sit in their break room or whatever. 
4 Q. Okay. Is that something that you were told 
5 by Market Source West, that's something you can't do? 
6 A. Yeah. Well, it's also food safety. 
7 Q. Let me ask you: On that day, do you know — 
8 would you have had water at your table just for yourself 
9 to drink, a bottle of water? 
10 A. We're not allowed to do that either because 
11 it's a food safety issue. 
12 Q. So is that something that Smith's told you 
13 not to do, or is that something that Market Source West 
14 would tell you? 
15 A. That's my personal — any food demos, I 
16 didn't keep — because I'd cooked before. And so just 
17 that's my personal belief. I don't drink anything. 
18 Q. So you wouldn't have had a can of soda, a 
19 bottle of water or anything for water or liquid at that 
20 demo table? 
21 A. If I remember correctly, there's like a 
22 drinking fountain somewhere around there. So I'd just go 
23 get a drink when needed. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 A. And that's another thing. We try to — or I 
22 
1 try, personally, to be close to like a fountain or 
2 somewhere where I could just get drinks. 
3 Q. Okay. Over the course of that day, how many 
4 communications would you have with store employees? 
5 A. Probably none, except to ask for meats and 
6 cheeses, if needed. 
7 Q. Okay. Do you recall specifically if you had 
8 any conversation that day or you — 
9 A . No. 
10 Q. So you don't remember? 
11 A. I don't remember. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. I f—sorry. 
14 Q. No, no. That's fine. Steve, I imagine that 
15 you wouldn't be able to identify or remember the name of 
16 any employee that you spoke with at the meat counter? 
17 A . No. 
18 Q. Okay. You departed at 5:00? 
19 A. Yep. I was out the doors at 5:00. 
20 Q. You're out the doors at 5:00. When would 
21 you — when do you start putting down or taking the table 
22 down and... 
23 A. About 4:40. That gives us; time to recount 
24 all the meat product, go pay for the meat product or 
25 cheese, whatever the product is. 
23 
1 Q. Okay. The table you bring, is that just a 
2 folding, cardboard table? 
3 A . Yeah. 
4 Q. You fold up the cardboard table, you recount 
5 the meat product. Is there — when you would be cleaning 
6 up, would you look to see that the area was dean of 
7 debris? 
8 A . Yeah. I mean, if we dropped any papers, we 
9 had a little garbage can. Sometimes people kicked it 
10 over or whatever, so we'd have to clean up that mess. 
11 And so, yeah. 
12 Q. Did Market Source West tell you when you left 
13 that you needed to clean up the area? 
14 A. No, that's just something that you do. You 
15 don't want to leave a mess so other people have to clean 
16 it up. 
17 Q. And you mentioned a garbage can. Is that 
18 something that you would bring? 
19 A. I t depends. Sometimes we would and sometimes 
20 the stores would have, like, an extra garbage can sitting 
21 somewhere. 
22 Q. Okay. And that was fairly standard to have a 
23 garbage can close to the demo table? 
24 A. Yeah. 
25 Q. Do you recall, on that day, whether you 
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1 brought your own garbage or whether you borrowed a 
2 garbage can from the store? 
3 A . I think I just used like a paper sack with a 
4 plastic bag in it. So it was all done by then. 
5 Q. And you would have that just next to the demo 
6 table? 
7 A . Yeah. 
8 Q. People could take whatever they're eating, 
9 toss the toothpick? 
10 A. Right. Or if they didn't like the product, 
11 they'd dump it in there. 
12 Q. Okay. So you would begin cleaning up at 
13 4:40, you would be out the door by 5:00? 
14 A . Um-humm. 
15 Q. You would recount the product. Was that the 
16 first step of cleaning up? You'd recount the product and 
17 then hand it back to the meat department? 
18 A . Usually I would actually fold up the table 
19 first. 
20 Q. Okay. 
21 A . And then — because that shows, "Hey, we're 
22 done with the demo, there's no more samples.1' 
23 Q. Okay. And then after folding up the table, 
24 what do you do? 
25 A. We go weigh the product or count the product. 
25 
1 Q. Okay. And where would the table be that you 
2 would fold up? Would it just be next to t h e - -
3 A. No, I 'd take it out to my car. 
4 Q. You'd take it out, and then you weigh and 
5 count the product? 
6 A . Yeah. 
7 Q. And then do you communicate with any store 
8 employee before leaving the store? 
9 A . Just the manager to get the store stamp — or 
10 assistant manager, whatever they have, to give us the 
11 store stamp. 
12 Q. Okay. Is there a document you fill out when 
13 you leave the store? 
14 A. Yeah, and Market West gives us that. 
15 Q. Let me show you something and ask you if — 
16 and I'm just going to use the first page, Tyler. 
17 Let's mark this as Exhibit 1, if we can. 
18 Does this look familiar to you? 
19 A . Yep, my own hand. 
20 Q. Okay. Is that the document — 
21 A . Yeah. 
22 Q. — that you would fill out? 
23 A . The exact document that we filled out. 
24 Q. Okay. That's all your handwriting? 
25 A . Yeah. Well , except for — let's see. I 'm 
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1 trying — except for the "very good." But, yeah, that's 
2 all my handwriting. 
3 Q. The "customer response, very good" is not 
4 your handwriting? 
5 A . I didn't wri te that. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. That's done by the company. 
8 Q. Okay. At the top line you can see dates of 
9 demo, Saturday, April 2nd, 2005. Next to that you see 
10 time of demo, 11:00 to 5:00. 
11 A . That's weird. 
12 Q. Would 11:00 be the time that you arrived? 
13 A. Yeah, it would have to be, if that's what 
14 this says. I was always on time or, if not, five minutes 
15 early. 
16 Q. Okay. And so you're not thinking that you 
17 were there at 12:00, I mean — 
18 A . I t must be 11:00. 
19 Q. — based on the form? 
20 A . Yeah, based on the form. 
21 Q. Okay. Steve, do you recall how busy that 
22 store was on that day? 
23 A . I t was actually pretty slow. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 A . I t wasn't very busy that day. 
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1 Q. Steve, would you have left the store earlier 
2 than 5:00? 
3 A . No, it takes about 20 minutes to clean up, 
4 and that's what we give ourselves. 
5 Q. Do you recall any communications with any 
6 Smith's employees that you haven't already discussed? 
7 A . No, not at all. 
8 Q. Okay. Over the course of your demo-ing, did 
9 any Smith's employees supervise you? 
10 A . No. 
11 Q. Did any Smith's employees check up to see how 
12 much product had been given out? 
13 A . No, not at all. 
14 Q. Steve, on that day do you recall spilling a 
15 glass of water at any time in the area of the store? 
16 A . No. No. 
17 Q. Okay. During the course of that day, did you 
18 see anyone else spill anything while you were demo-ing? 
19 A- Not while I was demoing or any time around 
20 it, huh-uh. 
21 Q. Okay. Did you - while you were demoing, did 
22 you see any spill of any kind on the floors of the 
23 Smith's store? 
24 A . No, not at all. 
25 Q. Okay. And is it fair to say, because you 
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Q. Different products7 
A. Different products. So I'd never actually 
done the meat and cheese before except for at this demo. 
Q. Just at Smith's7 
A. Just at Smith's. And then, you know, there 
was, you know, every other type of product you possibly 
could imagine we demoed. 
Q. Okay. Were your procedures different, say, 
if you were at Wal-Mart or Albertsons or Macey's — 
A . No. 
Q. - -as far as checking in and checking out7 
A . No. 
Q. Was it different than when you were at 
Smith's7 
A. Same thing. Go find the manager of 
whatever — you know, whatever product they're in and 
just set up where we want to set up — 
Q. Okay 
A. — close to our product or whatever. 
Q. So you would say all your answers you gave to 
Steven earlier with regards to checking in and checking 
out and the equipment you were provided with, all that 
stuff that you answered with regards to Smith's would 
apply to Albertsons — 
A. That's right. 
37 
L Q. -- Wal-Mart, all that7 
1 A . Yes. 
3 Q. So I'm just going to ask a few more specific 
4 questions about that If you were at Albertsons, after 
5 leaving, did they have anybody, a store employee, check 
6 the floor, check the area where you were at7 
7 MR. EDWARDS: Did you mean at Albertsons7 
8 Q. (BY MR. LARSEN) Excuse me. Any store 
9 besides Smith's 
0 MR. EDWARDS: Thank you. 
1 Q. (BY MR. LARSEN) Sorry. So Wal-Mart, 
2 Macey's, Albertsons, did they ever have anybody come and 
3 check the area where you were cleaning7 
4 A . No, no one did that . They didn't expect it 
5 of us either. 
6 Q. So there were no policies or requirements7 
7 A . Yeah, no policies or requirements on that. 
8 I f we cleaned it up, we cleaned it up. I 've seen 
L9 demo-ers leave trash behind. And that's one thing I 
10 never did. I t just not part of my habit, so... 
Zl Q. So no place ever required it7 
12 A . No. 
23 Q. Okay Did any of these stores, meaning 
24 Albertsons, Macey's, Wal-Mart, did any of them ever 
25 provide you with a floor mat to place under your booth or 
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1 around it7 
2 A . No, not at all. I t would have been nice 
3 sometimes, but no. 
4 MR. LARSEN: Okay That is all the questions 
5 I have I don't know if Tyler has any further 
6 MR. YOUNG: Do you mind if I ask a few7 
7 MR. EDWARDS: By all means 
8 EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. YOUNG: 
10 Q. Steve, you said sometimes - and I don't mean 
11 you, in particular, but demo folks, might leave a mess 
12 behind sometimes. And so you said you might see them 
13 leave trash or something like that Who would clean that 
14 up7 
15 A. I guess the store. 
16 Q. And can you think of a specific example of 
17 that, or is it just that it seems like there were some of 
18 those in your memory7 
19 A . Yeah, there's just — I don't know any 
20 specifics. 
21 Q. John asked you if — when you go into these 
22 other stores, stores other than Smith's, if you ever 
23 remember anybody walking back to check the area where 
24 you'd been after you cleaned up. 
25 A . Right. 
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1 Q. Do you ever remember somebody with — during 
2 your presence, going back to an area and physically 
3 checking the area you'd been at to maks sure it's check 
4 or clear7 
5 A . No. 
6 Q. Never remember that from another store7 
7 A . No. 
8 Q. What about if you noticed areas where other 
9 people had booths set up on a Saturday7 After those 
10 people had left, maybe they're leaving at the same time, 
11 but do you ever recall a store employee ever walking to 
12 those areas and checking those areas after7 
13 A . Not to my knowledge. 
14 Q. You hadn't noticed it7 
15 A . No. 
16 Q. But that doesn't necessarily mean it wouldn't 
17 happen7 
18 A . Yeah, I never seen it. 
19 Q. So maybe other stores had policies in place 
20 that you just weren't aware of where they were checking 
21 the area like where you're demo booth had been, but you 
22 just aren't aware, one way or another, whether they did 
23 that7 
24 MR. EDWARDS: Objection. Speculation. 
25 THE WITNESS: I'm not s j re one way or 
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1 another 
2 Q. (BY MR. YOUNG) Do you ever recall having a 
3 mess with the demo, I mean at any store, where you just 
4 needed some help cleaning it up because you didn't have 
5 the supplies or whatever7 
6 A . No, never. I t was very light stuff. I f we 
7 had to do anything, it was — yeah, there was usually not 
8 a mess I couldn't clean up. 
9 Q. Do you recall in other stores if there's any 
10 kind of a policy or anything like that where they require 
11 you to do your own cleaning after you leave7 I assume --
12 you said the messes are pretty easy and you usually do 
13 it But do you ever remember a policy of other stores 
14 saying if you make a mess, it's your mess, you better 
15 clean it up7 
16 A . No. 
17 Q. Nothing like that7 
18 A . No. 
19 Q. There's been some testimony in this case that 
20 Chuck Brown, I think the store manager of the Smith's in 
21 question here, says that — I may screw this up just a 
22 little bit. And Steve, you can correct me if I'm wrong. 
23 But I think generally he said on the day in 
24 question he remembers your booth being there and he 
25 remembers seeing, I think, a cup of drinking water on 
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1 your table. And Chuck says he remembers that very 
2 vividly. 
3 Now, I think you testified earlier that you 
4 don't remember having water, and it's generally not your 
5 policy to have like a cup of water on the table 
6 A . Right. 
7 Q. If Chuck were to say, "No, I absolutely 
8 remember that," would your — I mean, your testimony was 
9 that generally that wasn't your policy. But if there 
10 were evidence to the contrary, would you say that, okay, 
11 it's possible, you could have had a cup of water7 
12 A . No. 
13 Q. You don't think it was possible7 
14 A . I t 's not possible at all. 
15 Q. Okay. Now, why is that7 Because you worked 
16 for that company for a year, right7 
17 A . Right. 
18 Q. Okay. And so you think in a year you never 
19 had a cup of water on a table or a drink of water7 
20 A . No, never. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A . I didn't do that. I would go to the drinking 
23 fountain. 
24 Q. Okay Is it possible t he re - - t ha t ' s it I 
25 don't have anything else7 
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1 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. EDWARDS: 
3 Q. Can I ask just a couple follow-up questions7 
4 A . No problem. 
5 Q. You mentioned earlier that you worked for two 
6 different demo companies, is that correct7 
7 A . Yeah, I worked for — not at the same time. 
8 Q. Okay. B u t -
9 A . That's illegal. You can't do that. 
10 Q. And let me ask you what was the other name of 
11 other company7 
12 A . Classic Demos. 
13 Q. Did you work for Classic Demos before or 
14 after7 
15 A . I t would have been before that time. 
16 Q. How long did you work for Classic Demos7 
17 A . I don't even know. I 'm not sure. I t wasn't 
18 very long. 
19 Q. Would it have been less than a year7 
20 A . Yeah. 
21 Q. Did Classic Demos provide training as to what 
22 one does7 
23 A- Same — basically, the same thing. 
24 Q. Okay. But by the time you went to Market 
25 Source West, you had already been a demo-er before so you 
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1 kind of knew the process7 
2 A . Right, yeah. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A . I mean the paperwork was a little different, 
5 but that's about it. 
6 Q. Okay And then let me ask. On the day in 
7 question, April 2nd, 2005, did you see any water spills 
8 next to the meat coolers7 
9 A . Not that I could recall. 
10 MR. EDWARDS: Okay. That's all I have. 
11 Anything else7 
12 MR. YOUNG: No more 
13 MR. EDWARDS: We appreciate you coming in and 
14 having your deposition taken You have the right to 
15 review the deposition transcript Everything that we've 
16 said is written up, and there's a deposition transcript 
17 You have the right to review it just to make sure that 
18 everything is correct, or you can waive that right. What 
19 would you like7 
20 THE WITNESS: It doesn't matter to me. I 
21 guess I'll waive that right. 
22 MR. EDWARDS: Okay. 
23 THE WITNESS: I don't need to look at it 
24 MR. EDWARDS: Okay. Well, listen, we 
25 appreciate you coming in 
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1 A. They're like a Wal-Mart. They were here 
2 in Utah for a while, a Wal-Mart type set-up. 
3 (Door opens, Mr. Allen Young enters.) 
4 Q. BY MR. TYLER YOUNG: All right. So you 
5 worked for Gibson Discount after college how long? 
6 A. I was with them 35 years - excuse me 13 
7 years, sorry. 
8 Q. I was going to say, you didn't look that 
9 old. 
10 A. No. 13 years. 
11 Q. All right. And did you have any other 
12 jobs while you were with them? 
13 A. No; I didn't, huh-uh (negative). 
14 Q. Okay. What was your next job after 
15 working with Gibson? 
16 A. After that I worked for Smith's. I've 
17 been with Smith's 20 years. 
18 Q. Okay. When you were with Gibson Discount, 
19 what were your duties? I guess we could start at the 
20 beginning. What did you do when you started working 
21 there? 
22 A. Total store operation. I was also a buyer 
23 for them. I went overseas a couple times a year, 
24 went to Dallas, went to Chicago to do buying for 
j 25 them. But I managed the store in Murray. 
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1 Q. Okay. Were you always in Murray? 
2 A. I was. 
3 Q. All right. So 13 years with them. Did 
4 Smith's hire you away or did you just --
5 A. No. Gibson's actually went out of 
6 business. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. Then I went to work for Smith's right 
9 after. 
10 Q. All right. What are your duties with 
11 Smith's? What do you do there? 
12 A. Total store operation. We have 70 
13 employees and just total store operation. Sales, 
14 profit, expenses, total operation of the store inside 
15 and outside the store are my responsibility. 
16 Q. Okay. Has that always been your 
17 responsibility there or have you moved up? 
18 A. It's always been that, uh-huh 
19 (affirmative). 
20 Q. Okay. Now, what store is it that--
121 A. I manage a store in American Fork on 240 
22 Northwest State Road, American Fork, Utah. Store 
23 number 67, that's our store number. 
24 Q. Okay. I want to talk just for a minute 
125 generally about stores that set up booths and kind of 
7 
1 goodies on Saturdays that I've seen. In this case I 
2 know we've had some discussion with the other 
3 attorneys that there's been one of these companies 
4 that's been involved. I don't know if you've had a 
5 chance to talk with your attorney about that or 
6 anything. But can you tell me generally what you 
7 call these companies? Are they vendors? 
8 A. They're called demo companies. And I 
9 believe the way they operate, basically is the 
10 vendor -- the manufacturer, say if it was 
11 Lynn Wilson's or Nalley's or whoever, they probably 
12 pay the demo agency monies. And then the demo agency 
13 employs people. And then they're the ones that go 
14 out to the stores and do the demos for the products. 
15 And then I would think that from that point the demo 
16 company ekes out their profit, pretty much. 
17 Q. Okay. 
18 A. That's how they operate. They're-they 
19 handle that pretty much that way. 
20 Q. So the demo companies generally aren't the 
21 companies that are making the food products or 
22 whatever they're doing there in the stores -
23 A. Correct. 
24 Q. -- they're just demoing it? 
25 A. Correct. 
8 
1 Q. Okay. Can you just generally kind of tell 
2 me what the business of demoing encompasses? 
3 A. Demoing actually is - they're, like I 
4 say, the demo company has them come in on behalf of 
5 the manufacturer. And they demo - it could be 
6 Nalley's Chili. I t could be - in this case we're 
7 talking about, it was cheese and lunch meats for a 
8 company. I t could be a variance. And on Saturdays, 
9 we might have, you know, one or two demos, three. I t 
10 just depends. We may have none, you know. 
11 Q. All right 
12 A. It's all pre-set by Smith's though. I 
13 don't set it up. It's pre-set by the company. They 
14 have to go out to certain stores and demo for a 
15 certain period of time. 
16 Q. Okay. I want to talk about that just for 
17 a minute, the pre-setting, How were those contracts 
18 negotiated? Are they negotiated with Smith's 
19 corporate office? 
20 A. They are negotiated with Smith's corporate 
121 office. I don't have anything to do with that. 
22 Other than they call me and tell me I'm going to be 
23 in your store on Saturday afternoon. I say, fine. 
24 Usually the only other question they would ask you 
125 would be if you have the product. We would say yes 
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1 or no. You know, normally we do. 
2 Q. Who is it at the corporate office that 
3 deals with that? 
4 A. That I don't know. Because it varies. 
5 You would have to probably check with corporate on 
6 that how it's set up. It's pre-set because it's 
7 various departments. It could be a grocery item. It 
8 could be a meat item. It could be a service deli 
9 item. I t varies, you know. I'm sure we have 
10 somebody at corporate that could answer that. They 
11 set all that up with the demo company. They're set 
12 up in advance. And they go to different stores on a 
13 weekly basis. 
14 Q, Do you know who it would be that could 
15 tell us who would be in charge of that, who would be 
16 in charge of negotiating the contract? 
17 A. Boy, I don't know. I don't. You'd have 
18 to call the corporate - if you call the corporate 
19 number, they could connect you. There's an operator 
20 there at corporate. 974-1400 is our corporate 
21 number, area code 801. And then they could connect 
122 you. The operator on the phone is the corporate 
23 operator. They could connect you to the proper 
24 person that does that. 
[25 Q, All right, Who is in charge of overseeing 
10 
1 these folks at your store generally? 
2 A. At our store, pretty much they're on their 
3 own. I just know when they're coming. They will ask 
4 me where to set up pretty much. They'll set up close 
5 to the product. And then they will tell me what time 
6 they're going be there. And that's pretty much it. 
7 It's pretty much pre-set. Our main concern is just 
8 that we - we have the product to demo. 
9 Q. So you provide the product? 
10 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
11 Q. And they demo it? 
12 A. Right. Then they pay for the product that 
13 they - the product they sample to the customer, they 
14 pay for that usually when they leave. Because the 
15 store, the inventory is charged to me. So if they're 
16 going to say, in this case it was hams and cheeses, 
117 if they sampled and gave away, say, ten pounds of 
118 product, that would be shrinked to me in my store. 
119 But they'd track what they sample, and then they just 
20 pay for it like a regular - they pay retail. 
21 Q. Who tracks what they give away? 
22 A. We pretty much work - we do, with them. 
23 Then they just pay us for it. Usually a lot of times 
24 if it's canned items, they will just show us the 
]25 cans, then they will go scan them out the front end. 
11 
1 If it's a product like, say, Nalley's Chili or Hormel 
2 Chili, they will scan the empty canisters, like we 
3 would a sale, and everything scans off a UPC. And 
4 then they just pay us. 
5 Q. Do you have somebody in charge of that or 
6 do you do it yourself? 
7 A. They just go to the checkstand usually. 
8 It's an honor system with' them. 
9 Q. Yeah, They just grab the product and walk 
10 it up to the checkstand and run it through --
11 A. Or we'll give it to them. Sometimes we 
12 have product in the back and we'll give it to them to 
13 make sure they've got plenty of product. Not only 
14 the fact they sample it out, but they have to have 
15 product there with them if people wanted to buy chili 
16 or stewed beef or whatever it is. We have it there 
17 and they could buy it. Usually we set them up close 
18 to the product they're demoing. 
19 Q, I just want to narrow down the "we" just 
20 so I can be specific with this if I get there later 
21 on. Do you tell them where to go in the store? 
22 A. They usually check in with me, and then 
23 ask me where should we set up. I'll try to give them 
, 24 a location that's got, you know, high visibility by 
125 the customer and it's close to the product. In this 
12 
1 case we're talking about, it was service deli items, 
2 cheeses and meats, sliced meats. And those items we 
3 have to slice them ourselves because they have to be 
4 sanitary with gloves and all that. The sampling he 
5 did that day, he had a platter that he cut up 
6 product. And I believe he had it on some crackers. 
7 And that's how he was giving it to the customer. 
8 Then he'd have some napkins there and a waste can. 
9 Q. These guys that come in and demo, are they 
10 ever store employees? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Do you ever have employees -
13 A. I've never had - 1 don't know. They're 
14 not my store employees. I doubt it. I think it's a 
15 private enterprise that handles that. I'm not saying 
16 that they might not hire one of our people to do it 
17 part time or on the side. I don't know. I'm not 
18 aware of it. I've not -- I've never recognized 
19 anybody there that's been with Smith's. They're 
20 usually outside people. 
,21 Q. Are there things that you require of these 
122 folks in your store? Are there policies or 
23 procedures they have to follow in your store? 
24 A. Well, usually they're pre-trained from 
[25 their company. They have to be sanitary. They have 
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1 to be safe. They have to have good customer 
2 relations. And usually they do, within reason, 
3 Q. So you don't have any policies or 
4 procedures either, you and your stores, Smith's? 
5 Overall do you have any policies or procedures they 
6 need to follow while they're there? 
7 A, No. They don't work for us. So it's 
8 assumed they're pre-trained, 
9 Q. All right. 
10 A. To some degree I'm sure they are. 
11 Q, But if they're in your store, you don't 
12 have any policies to say, look, when you're in our 
13 store, you've got to do these things? 
14 A. No, 
15 Q. I'm going to come back to that in just a 
16 minute. Do you know if Smith's corporate requires 
17 these folks to carry insurance? 
18 A. I don't know for a fact. But usually our 
19 rule is they have to be insured and bonded before 
20 they will ever come into our store, anybody. Even 
21 our floor crew, janitors. We have outside floor 
22 service in all of our stores, and they all have to be 
23 bonded. I would think so. I would - not for sure, 
24 but knowing our company, I would say they have to be 
25 insured or bonded before they even let them. Even 
14 
1 people doing work on our stores, maintenance work 
2 outside. We do a lot of our own maintenance. But 
3 people we hire on the outside maintenance to do 
4 things, they check them out pretty close to make sure 
5 they're insured and everything. So in case something 
6 does happen, they're responsible, you know, So we're 
7 pretty carefully I think as a company. 
8 Q. Who makes sure that they're bonded before 
9 they come into your store? 
10 A. That would be somebody at corporate, 
11 whoever sets up the demo. Whoever is working with 
12 the demo people and that, I'm sure they're checking 
13 that they have insurance and everything. I'm sure 
14 they would require that. 
15 Q. I just want to jump back just for a 
16 minute. If the corporate office calls you and says 
17 we've got some folks that want to demo meats or 
18 cheeses, or whatever product it is, they call you and 
19 tell you they're going to come in. Do they tell you 
20 to expect a phone call from the demo person or how do 
121 you know- -
22 A. Usually the demo person calls usually four 
23 to five days in advance. They're usually in the 
24 store Friday or Saturday, usually a weekend. That's 
j 25 when they're the busiest They call and let us know 
15 
1 when they're demoing and make sure we have the 
2 product They usually don't give us the time. They 
3 usually a make sure we have the product. 
4 Q. Do you either call corporate or does 
5 corporate ever call you and say these folks are 
6 bonded and insured and meet all the requirements, or 
7 pretty much when they call you, you<assume they're 
8 ready to the come to the store? 
9 A. We just assume they are. I've got to 
10 think that corporate has really checked it out 
11 Q. Once a vendor is set up in your store 
12 there in American Fork, is there anybody in your 
13 store that oversees the operation of the vendors 
14 while they're conducting business? 
15 A. Not really. I walk the store quite often. 
16 And I might just chat with them for a minute, you 
17 know, how is it going, are you selling product. You 
18 know, sometimes it may -- maybe the location isn't 
19 right for them, maybe we've got to move to a 
20 different location to give them some more traffic. 
21 But generally it's, how are you doing, are you 
22 selling the product, you know. They're pretty much 
23 on their own because they're on instruction from 
24 their company on what to do. 
25 Q, For example, I've seen them before that 
16 
1 will cook stuff, and they'll have a little fire 
2 going. Do you or does somebody in the store try to 
3 check on that fire to make sure they're not going to 
4 burn your store down or -
5 A. We never usually have that kind of demo. 
6 The worst scenario for us would be a fry pan, they 
7 put a fry pan in and they're doing something that 
8 way. I've never seen a fire or anything like that. 
9 Like I say, the worst scenario is fry pan. A lot of 
10 demos are not even that. I t could be something cold 
11 or a canned product or whatever. In this case it was 
12 just hams and cheeses, you know. But fry pans are 
13 probably the worst scenario. 
14 Q. What about other things like water, 
15 grease, that kind of thing? Do you ever walk around 
16 and make sure they're not spilling stuff on the 
17 floor? Does anybody in your store do that? 
18 A. Yes. We have -- what we do, we inspect 
19 our floors once to twice per hour. I have a person 
20 that goes around. We have to punch a clock saying 
21 that we are going to walk the store. And we actually 
22 go beyond that. We're required once per hour to 
123 inspect our store. We sometimes will go as much as 
24 twice, it depends. And that's just one of our store 
S25 clerks walking around and then looking for spills or 
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17 
1 sweeping or anything, you know, picking up, It's 
2 just walking the perimeter of the store, plus the 
3 aisles. And we punch -- we call it a sweep. We 
4 punch it in, so legally we've actually walked our 
5 store. And we have a time and a person that's done 
6 that. 
7 And then the store has got a lot of floor 
8 cones, paper towels down the aisles that we put up if 
9 there is something. We can put it up and take care 
10 of the issue. Sometimes the customer will call us. 
11 Usually we notice it ourself or an employee will take 
12 care of it. We have precautionary cones and paper 
13 towels on all the aisles. 
14 Q. I think you've already answered a couple 
15 of these I was just about to go over. I apologize if 
16 I didn't get your answer on these the first time 
17 around originally. So when the vendors get to your 
18 store, they usually check in, you said, and you'll 
19 help them find the location they need to go? 
20 A. Correct 
21 Q. If it's meats and cheeses, you put them by 
22 the meats? 
23 A. In this case it was by the service deli, 
j 24 and that's where we put them. 
[25 Q. They just walk right into the store and 
18 
1 say I'm looking for Chuck? 
2 A. They ask for the person in charge usually, 
3 Then they direct them to me, and I'll talk to them 
4 and help them get set up. 
5 Q. Is there any paperwork they fill out? 
6 A. Usually there's paperwork when they get 
7 done. They have paperwork that they sign off that 
8 they're done. 
9 Q. What's that paperwork? 
10 A. Basically what the paperwork is for, it 
11 just - most of it is just the time they were there, 
12 make sure they're not cheating their demo company of 
13 time. So their sign-out time, their signing-out time 
14 that they were there. 
15 Q. And I think you said this is a corporate 
16 thing, but do you know how they get paid, the demo 
17 folks? 
18 A. I don't. I would think the demo company 
19 pays them. They work for the demo company, That's 
20 how they get paid. 
21 Q, Those are the folks that are in the stand? 
22 A. The demo company, they work for that 
23 company. They're a demo person that just works for 
24 that company. Then they come in and work in the 
125 store. The demo company itself, I think they get 
19 
1 paid from the vendors, I believe. I don't think 
2 Smith's pays the demo company. I think the vendors, 
3 like Nalley's and Kraft and those people, pay the 
4 demo company because they're demoing their product as 
5 part of their advertizing allowance. And then the 
6 demo company pays these people that work for them. 
7 And then between that they eke out their profit. I'm 
8 sure that's how it works." 
9 Q. Usually there's a table that they set up. 
10 Do you know who provides that table? 
11 A. Sometimes they have a table, and sometimes 
12 we'll help them out. If they don't have a table, 
13 then we've got some tables that we furnish for them 
14 if they want to use them. 
15 Q. What are the i r - -
16 A. Generally they have their own table, 
17 though. 
18 Q. What about their other equipment, like if 
19 they're cooking or knives or -
20 A. They furnish all their equipment. 
21 Everything is furnished by them. Fry pans, all that 
22 stuff is furnished by their company. 
23 Q. In this case you said they were giving out 
24 meats, So was it your deli that was actually cutting 
25 the meat? 
20 
1 A. I think what we were doing, we were 
| 2 probably slicing the meats and cheeses in large 
3 pieces. And then they would take it probably on 
4 their own platter, cut it up into smaller pieces, and 
5 put it on crackers. Then they bring their own 
6 napkins and they pretty well do it that way. Then we 
7 charge them for whatever product they ask us to 
8 slice. 
9 Q. What about coolers, if they need coolers 
10 to keep their food cool? I assume at Smith's, they 
11 usually get their food from Smith's -
12 A. A lot of them have these little portable 
13 coolers they bring. Sometimes they have their own. 
14 Sometimes we furnish ice. They have their cooler and 
15 put everything in there. 
16 Q. Do you k n o w -
17 A. Usually they'll slide it under their 
18 table, and they'll operate out of that. 
19 Q. Do you know what this company had, in this 
20 case? 
21 A. I don't remember. It's been a couple 
22 years since we've had this case, this issue. So I 
23 don't remember on this one. I actually don't think 
24 he had anything because he was getting product from 
125 us as he needed it. We were just selling it to him. 
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1 Then they would cut it up and put it on crackers, and 
2 then they were putting it out for customers to 
3 sample, 
4 Q, In the times where the folks come in and 
5 they're actually doing cooking on the frying pan, do 
6 you provide the frying pan? 
7 A. No, They have their own. 
8 Q. Do vendors like this often bring in their 
9 own water and coolers and things? 
10 A. They do, Well, the coolers, they have 
11 their own coolers. If they needed water or 
12 something, they'd ask us and, you know, we'd do 
13 whatever they need, you know, 
14 MR, HILBIG: Counsel, in this question you 
15 were asking about a vendor --
16 MR, TYLER YOUNG: Yeah, I'm sorry, demos. 
17 I could be more clear. 
18 Q. BY MR, TYLER YOUNG: Is that still your 
19 answer, with the demo company? 
20 A. They have their own, pretty much have 
21 their own. 
22 Q. What about lubricants? 
23 A. They would have their own, Usually if 
24 it's Pam or something they had to spray on the fry 
125 pan or something, they have their own stuff. If they 
22 
1 needed stuff, they'd just buy it, They give them 
2 money to buy. 
3 They don't have an account or anything. 
4 We used to do that, years ago. They had some kind of 
5 account thing. I t ended up not getting paid, and 
6 then Smith's would end up losing. So we make sure 
7 they have their own stuff, They have to have all 
8 their own everything, fry pans and lubricants, 
9 everything when they come in there, They actually 
10 just purchase it. I think the demo person just gives 
11 your a receipt and then they just get reimbursed from 
12 their company, which is the demo company. 
13 Q. Does Smith's have a policy that when these 
14 folks pick up their booth and leave or they pick 
15 everything up, when I say these folks I mean the 
16 folks doing the demos, do they go inspect that area? 
17 A. No. Huh-uh (negative). We don't. 
18 Q. All right. Who generally cleans up after 
19 the demo people leaves? 
20 A, Our policy with them is they clean up 
21 their area, And it's never been a problem, you know. 
22 Q. Is that a written policy? 
23 A, I would think that -- now, I didn't write 
24 the policy. But I'm sure when they set it up at the 
125 corporate level, that's probably their agreement they 
23 
1 have to clean up their area, yeah, Because it's 
2 clean when they come, and it's clean when they leave, 
3 If they have any trash or anything on the floor, you 
4 know, whatever, it has to be clean. 
5 Q, What about cleaning supplies and things7 
6 A. That would b e - t h a t would be them 
7 entirely. I mean if they needed paper towels or 
8 something, we'd furnish it to them if they asked us, 
9 you know. We're good that way. 
10 Q. Have you ever actually seen them bring 
11 their own cleaning supplies in? 
12 A. No. Usually they don't have a mess. It's 
13 usually they have a table cover on their table and 
14 usually it's like a paper table cover. So they will 
15 just throw it away and it's done, you know. They 
16 will have a garbage can under their table, and they 
17 will bring their own garbage can. They will just 
18 clean up that way. In the worst scenario they ask us 
19 where the trash is, the trash area. They will 
20 deposit their trash in the trash area of the store 
21 and be gone. So usually it's just a matter of taking 
22 the table cover off and emptying their trash and 
23 picking up themselves and they're done. That's 
24 usually how it works. I've never had an instance in 
25 20 years where they had an issue when they left, you 
24 
1 know. 
2 Q. Can you remember any time that somebody 
3 said, oh, hey, we've had a spill, can you send your 
4 people over to clean it up? 
5 A. Usually they'll clean it up. If there's 
6 an issue, it's usually a small issue. They're just 
7 working off a table in an area right there. Yeah, 
8 they know they're responsible for their area. 
9 Q. Other than in this case, have you ever had 
10 an experience where somebody from one of these booths 
11 has actually made a mess or something that somebody 
12 has slipped on or ever -
13 A. I have not. I have not. 
14 Q. Okay. Now, I just want to talk about 
15 general Smith's store policies for a minute. Are you 
16 the safety person in charge at your store, or is 
17 there somebody else that's in charge of that? 
18 A. My assistant manager is our safety person. 
19 But I'm over my assistant, so I'm really responsible 
20 for the entire store, 
121 Q. Who's the assistant manager? 
22 A. At that time it was BJ, Phillips. 
23 Q, Thank you. 
24 A. He's now located at the Saratoga store, 
125 Saratoga Smith's, He's been transferred to that 
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